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Cooper v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 104 (Dec. 27, 2018)1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Summary
The Court determined that removing a potential juror on the basis of race is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause and held that the district court erred when it did not find a prima facie
showing of race-based discrimination during the jury selection process.
Background
James Cooper, an African-American man, was initially charged with two separate counts
of child abuse, neglect or endangerment and one count each of battery constituting domestic
violence committed by strangulation and battery constituting domestic violence. These charges
were made in connection with his behavior at the home of the victim and her two children.
During the jury selection process, the State used two peremptory challenges to remove two
jurors: Juror No. 217 and Juror No. 274. These two jurors were African-American and therefore,
the same race as Cooper. The challenges came after all for-cause challenges were resolved. The
venire at the time of the challenges contained twenty-three prospective jurors, including three
African-Americans.
Cooper objected to the peremptory challenges pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky.2 Cooper
argued that the prospective jurors indicated they could be fair and, therefore, the current
circumstances of the challenges portrayed a pattern of striking African-American jurors. The State
rebutted by stating the African-American jurors were excused for-cause and that there was no
prima facie showing of discrimination. Moreover, the State argued that they only needed to justify
their reasoning if there was a prima facie showing of discrimination. The district court did not
make such a finding. It found that Cooper’s objection was based on a dislike for the racial makeup of the venire. The court also found that it could think of many non-discriminatory reasons the
State would have wanted to strike the two prospective jurors. Accordingly, the district court
dismissed the Batson challenge without allowing Cooper to provide further analysis. This appeal
followed.
Discussion
When a party raises a race-based objection to a peremptory challenge, the Court must conduct
the three-part Batson analysis.3 First, the party opposing the peremptory strike must make a “prima
facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race.”4 Once such a
showing is made, the party advocating for the peremptory strike must provide any race-neutral
explanations for the strike.5 Lastly, the district court is required to hear the arguments and

1
2
3
4
5

By Christi Dupont.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1876).
See Batson at 93–100.
Williams v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 83, 429 P.3d 301, 305 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 306.

determine whether the party opposing the peremptory strike has proven purposeful
discrimination.6
In the present case, the Court found that the prima facie showing in the first step of the Batson
analysis does not require the peremptory strike opponent to meet their ultimate burden of proof.7
Rather, the party must provide “sufficient evidence to permit the trier of fact to draw an inference
that discrimination occurred.”8 One example of an inference of discrimination could be a ‘pattern’
of strikes against black jurors included in the venire.9 Other evidence that may be sufficient
includes “the disproportionate effect of peremptory strikes [and] the nature of the proponent’s
questions and statements during voir dire.”10
Here, the State used 40 percent of its peremptory challenges (2 of 5) to remove 67 percent of
African Americans in the venire (2 of 3). The Court acknowledged that numbers alone are not
enough to prove prima facie discrimination, however, the numbers here proved a disproportionate
effect on African Americans, creating an inference of discrimination. The Court decided that this
inference of purposeful discrimination was enough to constitute a prima facie showing of
discrimination under the totality of the circumstances.
Because the district court dismissed the Batson analysis at its’ first-step, the Court here had
an inadequate record to perform the second-step of the Batson analysis. The Court found this
inappropriate because the Batson framework calls for real answers, not judicial speculation.11 The
inadequacy was especially problematic because the State asked venire members what their opinion
about the Black Lives Matter movement was, which was minimally relevant at best. While that
question contained race-based implications constituting further purposeful discrimination, the
Court could not perform the second step of the Batson analysis without hearing the State’s
reasoning.
Conclusion
The Court found that the district court erred when it stopped the Batson analysis at the first
step, where it found that a prima facie showing of discrimination did not exist and that the record
does not clearly support the denial of Cooper’s objection. Accordingly, the Court reversed
Cooper’s conviction and remanded to the district court for a new trial.
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